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Abstract
In this paper, an extended large wireless network under the secrecy constraint is considered. In contrast to
works which use idealized assumptions, a more realistic network situation with unknown eavesdroppers locations
is investigated: the legitimate users only know their own Channel State Information (CSI), not the eavesdroppers CSI.
Also, the network is analyzed by taking in to account the effects of both fading and path loss. Under these assumptions,
a power efficient cooperative scheme, named stochastic virtual beamforming, is proposed. Applying this scheme, an
unbounded secure rate with any desired outage level is achieved, provided that the density of the legitimate users tends
to infinity. In addition, by tending the legitimate users density to the infinity, the tolerable density of eavesdroppers
will become unbounded too.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, secrecy is an essential quality of service which is harder to meet in wireless networks, because their
broadcast nature increases the possibility of eavesdropping. Common methods rely on using algorithms with high
computational complexity that are hard to break for an adversary [1]. Another field which focuses on the attackers
with unlimited computational power is information-theoretic physical layer secrecy. Wiretap channel, the basic model
for information-theoretic secrecy, was introduced by Wyner in [2] through which reliable and secure transmission is
possible if the channel between the transmitter and the eavesdropper is the degraded version of the direct channel,
i.e., between the transmitter and the receiver.
There are many research works on wireless networks with few nodes [3], but wireless systems are getting larger
and larger and their exact performance analysis is getting complex, actually impossible. This leads the research
community to turn into the scaling laws and analyzing the asymptotic behavior. Large wireless networks was first
2investigated in [4] by Gupta and Kumar from the scaling laws point of view. They considered an ad hoc large network
with n randomly located nodes and the total rate that they achieved is O(
√
n). Effects of secrecy on large wireless
networks was investigated in [5] for the first time, where a large wireless network has been investigated that the
distributions of the legitimate and eavesdropper nodes are according to the Poisson point processes with densities
λl and λe, respectively. The result of [5] is that the secure communication with total rate of O(
√
n) is possible, as
long as λe/λl = O((log n)2), where n is the number of the legitimate nodes. These works showed that it is possible
to achieve the total rate that scales like
√
n under per node power constraint, with and without secrecy. However,
their main limiting assumption was considering a point-to-point multihopping communication which excludes the
possibility of cooperation using relays.
Authors in [6] proposed a cooperative scheme to achieve a total rate with near linear scaling under per node power
constraint in a large wireless network without secrecy constraints. In addition, they showed the possibility of zero cost
communication, i.e., unbounded total rate for fixed total power constraint. In [7] using active cooperative relaying
based schemes and with a bound on the number of the eavesdroppers, the authors showed that zero cost secure
communication is also possible. Recent developments in wireless technology (e.g., self interference cancellation,
power allocation scheme at the PHY layer, proper MAC protocol for the efficient implementation of the full-
duplex transmission mode [8]) support the relaying based cooperative models, in contrast to the traditional multi-hop
interference limited networks.
In the model of [5], [7], the Channel State Information (CSI) is known to the legitimate transmitter. However,
knowing CSI leads to the knowledge of the location of the passive eavesdroppers; that is not reasonable in many
practical cases. So the natural questions here are that if zero cost secure communication is possible under unknown
CSI. And, how should the cooperative strategies change to achieve this result? In addition, another important aspect
of wireless network, ignored in many works, is fading. How fading affects the secrecy rate in wireless systems is a
challenging question.
The secrecy rate in large networks with unknown CSI is investigated in some recent works. In [9], [10], the total
rate of order 1 was achieved in a large wireless network with fading when CSI is not known. The authors in [11]
took the advantage of path diversity to achieve the total rate of order
√
n
ln(n) in the case of unknown CSI, by limiting
the number of the eavesdroppers that can be tolerated. Adding network coding has improved this result in [12] to a
scheme in which any number of eavesdroppers could be tolerated without any change in the total achievable rate.
The unknown CSI assumption is also taken into account in other works such as [13], [14]. However, to the best of
our knowledge, none of the existing works uses relaying to achieve zero cost secure communication with unknown
CSI and/or fading.
In this paper, we answer the above question affirmatively by proposing a scheme that achieves zero cost secure
communication in a fading network and in the case of unknown CSI (including the eavesdroppers location). We
3consider a network with nl legitimate nodes and ne eavesdroppers that are distributed according to the Poisson point
processes with densities λl and λe. In contrary to the existing works, we achieve zero cost secure communication,
i.e., unbounded total secrecy rate, by using cooperation and distributed beamforming. In order to overcome the lack
of CSI knowledge, we propose a new scheme called, stochastic virtual beamforming. In this 2-stage scheme, we
benefit from the fading diversity by exploiting some relaying nodes near the transmitter. Actually, we design a decode
and forward scenario to direct the majority of the power toward the receiver location. To make this possible, at the
first step the transmitter sends the secure message to all the relaying nodes by using wiretap coding. The security
of this transmission step is provided by using the distance advantage of the relaying nodes in comparison with the
eavesdroppers. So we leverage the path-loss effect in a positive way. Then, at the second step, the relaying nodes
accomplish a distributed beamforming by setting their transmission coefficients proportional to the complex conjugate
of their channel gains to the receiver.
II. NETWORK MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
Throughout the paper, use upper case letters are used for denoting the random variables and lower-case letters for
their realizations. Also, superscripts l and e are used for denoting legitimate users and eavesdroppers, respectively.
We note the desired secure rate and outage level by RS and ǫ, respectively. Also, we define ǫ′ to be equal to ǫ7 .
Considering both path loss and fading effects, we use a common model for characterizing the power attenuation in
wireless mediums as [15]: PRPT = Cα210
x
10 d−γ , in which, PR is the received power; PT is the transmitted power; C
is a constant; α is the fading coefficient; 10 x10 denotes the shadow fading where X ∼ N(0, σ2); d is the distance
between the transmitter and the receiver; and γ is the path loss exponent which depends on the environment and
normally γ >= 2. α is assumed to have Rayleigh distribution with parameter µ. For simplicity, we ignore the effect
of shadow fading comparing with path loss effect (we remark that the shadowing effect is a random variable varying
with location not with time). Also, because of different and stochastic paths between the transmitter and the receiver,
the phase of the received signal (shown by θ) is modeled by a uniform distribution on [0, 2π]. The letters h and d
with appropriate subscripts and superscripts are used for indicating fading coefficients and distances, respectively.
So, the channel gain from the ith legitimate user to the jth legitimate user and also, to the kth eavesdropper can be
characterized by:
Gli,j=h
l
i,j(d
l
i,j)
−γ/2ejθ
l
ij (1)
Gei,k=h
e
i,k(d
e
i,k)
−γ/2ejθ
e
ik . (2)
We assume that the environment is isotropic. Hence the fading statistics is the same between every two nodes. We
consider a network with nl legitimate nodes and ne eavesdroppers that are distributed according to the Poisson point
processes with densities λl and λe. We consider the eavesdroppers as passive attackers with no collusion between
them. In addition, we assume that neither the location nor the fading coefficient of any eavesdropper channel is not
4known to the legitimate users. We consider an extended wireless network. In order to establish consistency between
the density of legitimate users (λl) and their total number (nl,), we consider the network as a square with the side
equal to
√
nl
λl
. Also, for the sake of simplicity we let the transmitter to be located at the center of the square. The
Rayleigh assumption for fading results in E
[
H2
]
= 2µ. Also, for simplicity we assume that the noise variances of
all the channels, either legitimate or non-legitimate, are the same and equal to unity.
III. MAIN RESULTS
The main result of this paper is summarized in the following theorem. This theorem states that the zero-cost secure
communication is possible by using our proposed scheme when eavesdroppers CSI is not known to the legitimate
users. The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of this result, where we analyze the scheme in detail and derive
six constraints for different parameters of the network. These constraints are consistent and can be selected step by
step.
Theorem 1: In the extended network with fading and unknown eavesdroppers CSI (defined in Section II), under
the constant power constraint and by letting the legitimate users density to be sufficiently large, any desired pair of
secure rate and outage level denoted by (RS ,ǫ) is achievable.
Proof: We propose a scheme which achieves the desired result. Our proof has two steps: (i) In the first step, we
consider the transmission from the transmitter (source) to the relaying nodes and guarantee a specific secure rate RS
with high probability for this transmission. Our technique is based on defining two circles, denoted by Bl and Be,
centered at the transmitter and radii al and ae, while al < ae (see Fig.1). Then λl, λe, al, and ae are chosen such that
the following three requirements are provided. First, with the probability greater than 1− ǫ′, no eavesdropper lies in
Be. Second, with the probability greater than 1− ǫ′ at least nr legitimate users lie in Bl. Third, the difference of the
worst legitimate channel and the best eavesdropper channel be greater than RS with a probability greater than 1− ǫ′.
(ii) In the second step, we analyze the rate from the relay nodes to the receiver and guarantee the second rate using
the cooperation of nr relaying nodes. Actually, we make this distributed Multiple-Input Single-Output Single-antenna
Eavesdropper (MISOSE) situation to concentrate the most of the transmitted power in a neighboring region of the
receiver. It can be deduced from our following calculations that by increasing nr, both RS and ǫ can be improved,
i.e., increased and decreased, respectively.
A. Step 1: First rate analysis
In this step, we guarantee a secure rate RS for the transmission from the transmitter to the relaying nodes with
an outage level of 2ǫ′. To make this possible, we choose the radius of the circles Bl and Be in a way that even with
considering possible exacerbating effects of the fading, the difference between the capacities of the worst legitimate
channel and the best eavesdropper channel be greater than RS which is done by obtaining proper upper and lower
5bounds on al and ae, respectively. Hence, the following constraint must hold:
min
1≤i≤nr ,1≤j≤ne
C li −Cej > RS (3)
where C li is the rate of the link from the transmitter to the i-th legitimate user and Cej is the rate of the link from the
transmitter to the j-th eavesdropper. To simplify the analysis, we work with a suboptimum problem and we guarantee
the following two inequalities:
min
1<i<nr
C li > (1 + ρ)RS , (4)
max
1<j<ne
Cej < ρRS . (5)
in which, ρ is an arbitrary positive constant and the problem can be optimized over ρ. Now, to establish (4) and (5),
we present appropriate upper and lower bounds on al and ae, respectively, where each bound holds with an outage
level of ǫ′.
1) The legitimate rate analysis: In the following theorem, considering the constraint on C li , we derive an appropriate
upper bound on al.
Theorem 2 (Upper bound on al): A sufficient condition for having (4), with an outage level of ǫ′, is:
al <
(−PTµ ln (1− ǫ′nr )
2(1+ρ)RS − 1
) 1
γ
. (6)
Proof: Using the union bound we guarantee the outage level of ǫ′nr for the rate of each of the nr relaying nodes
in Bl, to guarantee the outage level of ǫ′ for the minimum of these rates. We write for one of them, chosen arbitrarily:
log (1 + PTh
2d−γl ) > log (1 + PTh
2a−γl ) > (1 + ρ)RS ⇒
aγl <
Ph2
2(1+ρ)RS − 1 . (7)
where dl and h are the distance and the channel gain (respectively) between the transmitter and the chosen relay, so
dl < al. We require the validity of (7) with a probability more than 1− ǫ′nr . With respect to the Rayleigh distribution
assumption for h, the distribution of h2 is exponential with parameter 1µ . Hence, with the probability of 1− ǫ
′
nr
, we
have: h2 > −µ ln (1− ǫ′nr ). Thus, if al satisfies the bound in (6), the inequality (7) holds with a probability more
than 1− ǫ′nr .
2) Network Layering scheme and eavesdropper rate analysis: To analyze the eavesdroppers rates, one can follow
a similar approach to what presented in the previous part. However, the eavesdroppers are distributed in all around
the network and their distances from the transmitter vary from ae to the radius of the network. Hence, following
the same approach would yield a loose bound on ae. For deriving a tighter bound we propose a network layering
scheme. In this scheme, as shown in Fig. 1, the network is divided to a number of layers and the eavesdroppers rates
in each layer is analyzed separately. To be precise, the k-th layer is defined as the region of the network between
the radii 2k−1ae and 2kae. We repeat this procedure till the boundary of the network. In the following, we propose
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Fig. 1. The inner and outer circles and the two first layers in the network layering scheme
a lower bound on ae using this idea. We denote the number of layers by KL and the k-th layer by Lk. The area of
Lk, denoted by Sk, is equal to Sk = π
(
22k − 22(k−1)) a2e = 3π22(k−1)a2e . To bound the number of eavesdroppers in
each layer we present two following lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Number of eavesdroppers in each layer): For any positive constant βk, define tk as:
tk ,
(βk
ǫ′
.
1
λeSk
) 1
2 . (8)
Then, with a probability larger than 1− ǫ′βk , the number of eavesdroppers in Lk (denoted as ne,k) satisfies:
ne,k < (1 + tk)λeSk. (9)
Proof: Considering Poisson distribution of eavedroppers locations, we use Chebyshev’s inequality for ne,k to
write:
Pr {ne,k > λeSk + tkλeSk}
< Pr
{
|ne,k − λeSk| > tk
√
λeSk
√
λeSk
}
<
1
t2kλeSk
.
Lemma 2: If in Lemma 1, we set βks such that
∑KL
k=1
1
βk
< 1 holds, then, the inequality (9) will be valid for all
the layers, with a probability larger than 1− ǫ′.
Proof: Using the union bound for the undesired event in each layer, we can bound the global undesired event.
Therefore, the probability that the inequality (9) does not hold in at least one layer is bounded by:
KL∑
k=1
ǫ′
βk
= ǫ′
KL∑
k=1
1
βk
.
Assuming the condition introduced in the lemma on βks, this quantity will be less than ǫ′.
7Now we derive a proper bound on ae using the above lemmas. In fact, each layer imposes a lower bound on ae
and the largest lower bound is the main constraint on ae. Our technique of deriving these bounds is summarized in
the following. We divide the tolerable error ǫ′ between all the layers, dedicating the tolerable error ǫk = ǫ
′
2k to the
Lk, and we find a proper lower bound to guarantee the outage probability of ǫk for this layer. In the analysis of each
layer we apply the union bound for the eavesdroppers in that layer. Finally, we apply the union bound on the outage
events of these layers to find a bound on the probability of the total outage event. This total outage probability is
less than ǫ′, because of how ǫks are allocated.
Using Lemmas 1 and 2, we work with (1+tk)λeSk as the maximum number of eavesdroppers in Lk. The following
lemma gives the constraint on ae concluded from Lk.
Lemma 3: Given the inequality (9), a sufficient condition to have,
max
j∈Lk
Cej < ρRS (10)
with a probability greater than 1− ǫk, is the following constraint on ae:
ae > a
(k)
e , 2
−(k−1)
( −PTµ
2ρRS − 1 ln (
ǫ′
2kλe(1 + tk)Sk
)
) 1
γ
. (11)
Proof: To guarantee the outage level of ǫ′2k for the validity of (10), relying on the union bound, we guarantee
the outage level of ǫ′2kne,k for the validity of the following inequality:
Cej < ρRS (12)
for each of the eavesdroppers, e.g., the j-th eavesdropper, in this layer. Considering the condition (9) on ne,k, it
suffices to guarantee the outage level of ǫ′2kλe(1+tk)Sk for each of the eavesdroppers. For one of the eavesdroppers,
arbitrarily chosen, we write:
log (1 + Ph2d−γe ) < log (1 + Ph
2(2−k−1ae)−γ) < ρRS .
The first inequality is deduced from de < 2k−1ae, in which de is the distance between the transmitter and the chosen
eavesdropper. For simplicity, the other indices are eliminated. We want the second inequality to be valid with a
probability greater than 1− ǫ′2kλe(1+tk)Sk . With the same probability, for the coefficient h2, considering its exponential
distribution, the following inequality holds:
h2 < h2max , −µ ln
(
ǫ′
2kλe(1 + tk)Sk
)
.
Hence, to provide the desired outage level, it suffices to guarantee the inequality
log (1 + Ph2max(2
−(k−1)ae)−γ) < ρRS ,
by proper choice of ae. With a little algebraic efforts and displacing the variables, the recent inequality can be
converted to (11).
8Now, we put all the results together in the following theorem. Then, from this theorem and by some substitutions
and calculations, we conclude the Corollary 1 in which an appropriate lower bound is finalized for ae.
Theorem 3: Given the coefficients tk and βk consistent with the assumptions presented in Lemmas 1 and 2 and
by choosing
ae > max
1≤k≤KL
a(k)e , (13)
the rate inequality (5) holds with an outage probability less than 2ǫ′.
Proof: Note that the inequality (5) is valid if and only if the one in (10) is valid. We define the binary random
variable Ok as
Ok =

 0 if maxj∈Lk C
e
j < ρRS ,
1 if maxj∈Lk Cej > ρRS .
(14)
In addition, we define the binary random variable Qk as
Qk =

 0 if ne,k < (1 + tk)λeSk,1 if ne,k > (1 + tk)λeSk. (15)
Now, using the union bound, we write:
Pr
{
max
1<j<ne
Cej > ρRS
}
<
LK∑
k=1
Pr {Ok = 1}. (16)
Also, we expand the occurrence probability of Ok in Qk as the following:
Pr {Ok = 1} =
∑
i=0,1
Pr {Qk = i}Pr {Ok = 1|Qk = i}
(a)
≤ Pr {Ok = 1|Qk = 0} +Pr {Qk = 1} . (17)
Considering that the value of the probability function is not never more than the unity, the terms Pr {Qk = 0} and
Pr {Ok = 1|Qk = 1} in the inequality (a) are replaced by 1. First, we investigate the first term of (17). Given (13),
the offered sufficient condition presented in the Lemma 3 ((11)) holds for all the layers. So, considering this lemma,
we have:
Pr {Ok|Qk = 0} < ǫ
′
2k
. (18)
By summing up in all the layers, we write:
LK∑
k=1
Pr {Ok|Qk = 0} <
Lk∑
k=1
ǫ′
2k
< ǫ′. (19)
Now we consider the second term in (17). For the summation of these terms, according to the Lemma 2, we have:
KL∑
k=1
Pr {Qk = 1} < ǫ′. (20)
Now the proof is completed by applying (17) in (16) and then using the inequalities (19) and (20).
9Corollary 1: By choosing
ae =
(PTµ)
1
γ
(2ρRS − 1) 1γ
(ln
− ln (1− ǫ′)6
ǫ′
+
√
2ǫ′
(− ln (1− ǫ′)3)3 ), (21)
the outage probability of (5) is less than 2ǫ′.
Proof: We start from the right side of the constraint (13) in the recent theorem and insert the value of a(k)e from
(11). Also, we replace tk by its calculated value from (8) and for any 1 ≤ k ≤ KL, we set:
βk = 2
k. (22)
It’s clear that by this choice, the required condition in the Lemma 2 for βks is established. Furthermore, we replace
λe by its value from (48). Now, we can write:
ae = max
1≤k≤KL
a(k)e
=
(
Pµ
2ρRS − 1
) 1
γ
max
1≤k≤KL
−2−(k−1) ln ǫ
′
2kλeSk(1 + tk)
=
(
Pµ
2ρRS − 1
) 1
γ
max
1≤k≤KL
2−(k−1) × ln
−3× 23k−2 ln (1− ǫ′) +
(
4
−3ǫ′ ln (1−ǫ′)
) 1
2
β
1
2
k
ǫ′
(a)
=
(
Pµ
2ρRS − 1
) 1
γ
max
1≤k≤KL
2−(k−1) ln
(
c12
3k + c22
k
2
)
=
(
Pµ
2ρRS − 1
) 1
γ
max
1≤k≤KL
2−(k−1) ln c123k
(
1 +
c2
c1
2
−5
2
k
)
(b)
<
(
Pµ
2ρRS − 1
) 1
γ
max
1≤k≤KL
2−(k−1)(3k ln 2 + ln c1 +
c2
c1
2−
5
2
k)
(c)
=
(
Pµ
2ρRS − 1
) 1
γ
(
3 ln 2 + ln c1 +
c2
4
√
2c1
)
In the equation (a), the following definitions are used:
c1 ,
−3 ln (1− ǫ′)
4ǫ′
, (23)
c2 ,
√
4
−3ǫ′ ln (1− ǫ′) . (24)
Inequality (b) is deduced from lnx < x − 1 for x > 0 and x 6= 1. The inequality (c) is obtained by considering
that the argument of maximization is a decreasing function in k, so it takes its maximum at k = 1. Substituting this
value for k, the last line is obtained.
By replacing c1 and c2 by their values we reach to the same value in the relation (21). Now we set ae equal to this
value. Hence, the desired condition in the theorem 3 will be valid, too.
Remark 1: We remark that the proposed idea for layering the network is really effective. In fact, as it’s clear
from (21), the final constraint on ae is independent of the number of the eavesdroppers (and so from the size of
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the network). Therefore, by extending the network and so increasing the total number of the eavesdroppers, it’s not
necessary to limit the eavesdropper-free region anymore.
B. Step 2: Second rate analysis
In this subsection we analyze the second rate, i.e., forward rate, and from it we derive the proper constraint on nr.
1) Fading calculations: In this part we pick arbitrarily one of the eavesdroppers and do the calculations for it. We
denote the channel gain vector between the source and the legitimate and the non-legitimate users, respectively, as:
gl =
(
(dl1)
−γ/2hl1e
jθl
1 , . . . , (dlnr )
−γ/2lhlnre
jθlnr
)
, (25)
ge = ((de1)
−γ/2he1e
jθe
1 , . . . , (denr )
−γ/2henre
jθenr ). (26)
We assume that the distance between every two users is greater than half of the wavelength. This assumption yields
the uncorrelation of different fading gains and phases [16]. We establish a virtual and distributed MISOSE situation
using adequate relaying nodes. This scheme has two advantage comparing with conventional Multiple-Input Multiple-
Output (MIMO) schemes. First, it does not need the devices to be equipped with multiple antennas. Second, as noted
in [1], the maximum number of antennas in practical MIMO systems has physical limitation. But, in this scheme
we can exploit more relaying nodes and benefit more from channel diversity. In [17], for MISOSE situation with
ergodic capacity criterion and known CSI and only for legitimate users, it has been proved that the efficient strategy
for the beamforming of the transmission vector is to align it in the direction of the fading vector. Thus, by a similar
technique, we align the beamforming vector in the direction of complex conjugate of channel gain vector, i.e., (gl)∗,
to maximize the correlation between these two vectors. In order to control the total consumed power, we set the
beamforming vector equal to (g
l)∗
nr
. Given only legitimate users CSI, it is a reasonable strategy.
Message transmission scheme: For the message set M = [1 : 2nR] and for any m ∈M , a proper codeword Xn
generated from Wyner wiretap coding is chosen and transmitted by the transmitter. We denote the average power of
the transmitter by PT . The relaying nodes decode their received sequence to obtain the transmitted message m. In
the next step, the i-th relaying node uses the same codebook to send the sequence Fi = 1√nr (d
l
i)
−γ/2hiXne−jθ
l
i in
n transmission intervals. So the power consumed by the i-th relaying node and the total consumed power equal to:
Pi =
1
ntnr
nt∑
t=1
(dli)
−γh2i |X(t)|2 =
(dli)
−γh2i
nr
PT , (27)
P (tot)T =
nr∑
i=1
Pi = (
1
nr
nr∑
i=1
(dli)
−γh2i )PT . (28)
Furthermore, the received signals at the end of the t-th transmission interval are:
Y (t) = (
1√
nr
nr∑
i=1
(dli)
−γ(hli)
2)X(t),
Z(t) = (
1√
nr
nr∑
i=1
(dli)
−γ/2(dei )
−γ/2hlih
e
i e
j(θei−θli))X(t).
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Finally, the received powers at the legitimate user and the eavesdroppers are:
Pl = (
1√
nr
nr∑
i=1
(dli)
−γh2i )
2PT , (29)
Pe =
∣∣∣ 1√
nr
nr∑
i=1
(dli)
−γ/2(dei )
−γ/2hlih
e
i e
j(θei−θli)
∣∣∣2PT . (30)
Now we consider these two recent random variables (i.e., Pl, Pe) and give bounds on their expected values and
variances. Having these in hand, we can use a bounding inequality, like Chebyshev’s inequality, to predict the
behavior of these two quantities with high probability.
Probabilistic results: Based on the assumptions we noted previously about the fading coefficients, we proved the
following bounds for the expected value and variances of Pl and Pe. The proof is provided in appendix A.
Theorem 4: By appropriate choices for η and ν, the following bounds hold:
E [Pl]
PT
> ηnr(dTR + al)
−2γ , (31)
E [Pe]
PT
< η(ae − al)−γ(dTR − al)−γ , (32)
σ2(Pl)
P 2T
< ν2nr(dTR − al)−4γ , (33)
σ2(Pe)
P 2T
< ν2(ae − al)−2γ(dTR − al)−2γ . (34)
where, dTR is the distance between the transmitter and the receiver. It is assumed that the receiver is out of the inner
circle (Bl).
To continue, we look for the sufficient number of relaying nodes in order to attain the secure rate RS with outage
probability less than 2ǫ′. We use Chebyshev’s inequality to establish proper bounds on probability of the undesired
events defined on the amount of Pl and Pe. We wish to have Cl −maxi∈E Cei > RS with a probability greater than
1− ǫ′. But, for the sake of simplicity, we guarantee the following bounds, each with the probability of 1− ǫ′:
Cl > (1 + κ)RS , (35)
max
i∈E
Cei < κRS . (36)
where, κ is an arbitrary positive constant which can be optimized if necessary. Now, we derive the proper bounds
on the network parameters by analyzing the above limitations. Instead of (36), using a union bound approach, we
consider the following constraint for each eavesdropper:
Cei < κRS (37)
with the probability of 1− ǫ′ne .
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2) Legitimate rate analysis: The constraint in (35) implies Pr {Cl = log (1 + Pl) < (1 + κ)RS} < ǫ′, or equiva-
lently:
Pr
{
Pl < 2
(1+κ)RS − 1
}
< ǫ′. (38)
Now, we apply Chebyshev’s inequality and drive a lower bound on nr which guarantees (38). Noting the expected
value and the variance of Pl by ηl and ν2l , respectively, we apply the inequalities of Theorem 4 for these two values.
First, we write:
Pr
{
Pl < 2
(1+κ)RS − 1
} (a)
< Pr {Pl < ηl − ανl}
< Pr {|Pl − ηl| > ανl}
(b)
<
1
α2
(c)
≤ ǫ′.
where, (b) follows from Chebyshev’s inequality,for (c) we set: α =
√
1
ǫ′ , and for (a), it’s sufficient to have: 2(1+κ)RS−
1 < ηl − ανl, or equivalently: νl < 1α(ηl − 2(1+κ)RS + 1. Considering (31) and (33), it’s sufficient to establish the
following chain:
νl
(d)
< ν
√
nr(dTR − al)−2γPT
(e)
<
1
α
(ηnr(dTR + al)
−2γPT − 2(1+κ)RS + 1)
(f)
<
1
α
(ηl − 2(1+κ)RS + 1).
where, (d) and (f) are deduced from Theorem 4. We establish (e) by choosing nr sufficiently large. After some
algebraic calculations, (e) can be written as the following quadratic inequality in √nr:
nr(η(dTR + al)
−2γPT )−√nr(αν(dTR − al)−2γPT )
− 2(1+κ)RS + 1 > 0.
in which only one of the two roots is positive and so acceptable. By choosing nr greater than the square of this root,
we reach a constraint on nr presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 5 (Lower bound for nr): A sufficient condition on nr for guaranteeing (35) with an outage level of ǫ′ is
to have:
nr >
(dTR − al)−4γ
4η2(dTR + al)−4γ
(
ν√
ǫ′
+
√
ζ)2, (39)
ζ =
ν2
ǫ′
+ 4η
(dTR + al)
−2γ
PT (dTR − al)−4γ (2
(1+κ)RS − 1).
In order to get an intuition from the behavior of this constraint, we put a simplifying assumption on al, which makes
this constraint independent of al. For this, we assume:
al < dTR/2. (40)
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We justify this assumption by noting that if the receiver lies in Bl, it is not necessary to exploit the stochastic
virtual beamforming scheme. Actually in this situation, based on the calculations for the first rate, the message can
be delivered securely to the receiver by direct transmission. Here, for the sake of simplicity, after choosing a valid
value for al, i.e., a value which satisfies the constraint in (6), we divide it by two. By this choice, we can send the
secure message directly to the receiver whenever the receiver is in the distance of at most 2al. Therefore, we use
our proposed scheme, i.e., the stochastic virtual beamforming, only when (40) holds. Using this, constraint (39) is
turned to the following simplified version. The proof is simple and is completed by bounding dTR ± al properly.
Corollary 2: A simplified sufficient condition on nr to guarantee (35) with the outage level of ǫ′ is to have:
nr >
81
4η2
( ν√
ǫ′
+
√
ν2
ǫ′
+
4η
PT
d2γTR(2
(1+κ)RS − 1)
)2
. (41)
3) Eavesdropper rate analysis: Now, we proceed in a similar way to obtain another constraint to guarantee (37)
for the eavesdropper rate with high probability. As noted previously, for the arbitrarily chosen eavesdropper, we wish
to have: Pr {log(1 + Pe) > κRS} = Pr
{
Pe > 2
κRS − 1} < ǫ′ne . Similar to the previous part, we use ηe and ν2e to
denote the expected value and the variance of Pe. We start with:
Pr
{
Pe > 2
κRS − 1} (a)< Pr {Pe > ηe + ανe}
< Pr {|Pe − ηe| > ανe}
(b)
<
1
α2
(c)
≤ ǫ
′
ne
,
where (b) follows from Chebyshev’s inequality and for (c) we set α = √neǫ′ . Similar to the previous part, for
establishing (a), it’s sufficient to have νe < 1α (2κRS − ηe − 1). Now, considering (32) and (34), it is sufficient to
establish the following chain,
νe
(d)
< ν(ae − al)−γ(dTR − al)−γPT
(e)
<
1
α
(
2κRS − η(ae − al)−γ(dTR − al)−γPT − 1
)
(f)
<
1
α
(
2κRS − ηe − 1
)
.
By some substitution and assuming the other parameters to be constant, the inequality (e) can be converted to a
constraint on ne, as follows:
ne < ǫ
′(2κRs − η(ae − al)−γ(dTR − al)−γ − 1
ν(ae − al)−γ(dTR − al)−γPT
)2
. (42)
C. Poisson calculations
1) Constraint related to the inner circle: We must have at least nr legitimate relaying nodes in the circle Bl,
where nr is chosen appropriately regarding the former constraint in (39). In the following, we start by bounding the
probability of undesirable event, i.e., having less than nr nodes in Bl, using Chebyshev’s inequality. Then, using this
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bound, we derive a sufficient condition for λl, in order to keep the probability of undesirable event less than ǫ′. By
defining the kl as the number of legitimate nodes in Bl, we write:
Pr {kl < nr} < Pr
{|kl − λlπa2l | > λlπa2l − nr}
= Pr

|kl − λlπa2l | >
√
λlπa
2
l
λlπa
2
l − nr√
λlπa
2
l


<
λlπa
2
l
(λlπa
2
l − nr)2
. (43)
To satisfy the outage probability constraint, it suffices to set (43) less than or equal to ǫ′. In the equality case, we
reach the following equation from which a lower bound on λl is deduced. By satisfying this constraint, we have at
least nr legitimate nodes in the inner circle, Bl, with probability larger than 1− ǫ′.
λ2l (π
2a4l )− λl(2nr +
1
ǫ′
)πa2l + n
2
r = 0⇒
λl =
nr +
1
2ǫ′ ±
√(
nr +
1
2ǫ′
)2 − n2r
πa2l
(44)
Note that the smaller solution in (44) is not acceptable, because it yields values for λl which are lower than nrπa2l .
So we work with the greater solution. As a sufficient condition, we can choose λl to be greater than this solution.
Therefore,
λl >
nr +
1
2ǫ′ +
√
(nr +
1
2ǫ′ )
2 − n2r
πa2l
=
nr
πa2l
(
1 +
1
2ǫ′nr
+
√
(1 +
1
2ǫ′nr
)2 − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
βl(ǫ)
)
. (45)
By the above definition of βl(ǫ), we summarize the constraint as:
λl > βl(ǫ).
nr
πa2l
. (46)
2) Constraint related to the outer circle: As mentioned previously we need the circle Ce to be free of eaves-
droppers, with probability larger than 1 − ǫ′. By defining ke as the number of eavesdroppers in Be, we want to
have:
Pr {ke = 0} > 1− ǫ′ ⇒ e−λeπa2e > 1− ǫ′ (47)
which results in the constraint:
λe <
− ln(1− ǫ′)
πa2e
(48)
The main six constraints for al, ae, nr, ne, λl and λe are given in (6), (21), (41), (42), (46) and (48), respectively.
To achieve any desired pair of (RS , ǫ), we proceed as follows. First, we set nr satisfying (41), which just depends
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on RS and ǫ and not the other five parameters. Knowing nr, we choose al properly from its constraint in (6). Then,
the required λl is calculated by inserting the value of nr and al in (46). In addition, minimum of ae is computed
by knowing RS and ǫ from (21). Then, the maximum tolerable amount of λe is derived from (48). It is seen that
by tending λl to infinity, the maximum tolerable density of eavesdroppers tends to infinity, too. This completes the
proof.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
First, we consider the problem without the path loss effect and analyze the four desired quantities for this case.
Then, we add the effect of path loss and update the previous bounds for this case.
The following fading vectors are in fact the simplified versions of channel gain vectors, gl and ge, when all the
coefficients related to path loss effect are substituted by unity:
hl = (hl1e
jθl
1 , . . . , hlnre
jθlnr ), (49)
he = (he1e
jθe
1 , . . . , henre
jθenr ). (50)
In the following lemma, the values of the four desired quantities are given when the path loss effect is eliminated.
Lemma 4: Under the assumptions noted in the paper for the fading coefficients, the mean and the variance of Pl
and Pe satisfy the following constraints, when the path loss effect is eliminated:
E [Pl]
PT
= (nr − 1)E2
[
H2
]
+ E
[
H4
]
> (nr − 1)E2
[
H2
]
+ E2
[
H2
]
= nrE
2
[
H2
]
, (51)
E [Pe]
PT
= E2
[
H2
]
, (52)
σ2(Pl)
P 2T
= 4nr
(
E
[
H4
]
E
2
[
H2
]− E4 [H2])+ · · · = O (nr) , (53)
σ2(Pe)
P 2T
=
1
nr
E
4
[
H2
]
+ · · · = O (1) . (54)
Proof: Analysis for mean of Pl:
E [Pl]
PT
= E

( 1√
nr
nr∑
i=1
(hli)
2
)2
=
1
nr
E
[
nr∑
i=1
nr∑
k=1
(hli)
2(hlk)
2
]
=
1
nr
(
nrE
[
H4
]
+ nr(nr − 1)E2
[
H2
])
= (nr − 1)E2
[
H2
]
+ E
[
H4
]
> (nr − 1)E2
[
H2
]
+ E2
[
H2
]
= nrE
2
[
H2
]
.
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Analysis for mean of Pe:
E [Pe]
PT
= E

∣∣∣∣∣ 1√nr
nr∑
i=1
hlih
e
i e
j(θei−θli)
∣∣∣∣∣
2


=
1
nr
E
[
nr∑
i=1
nr∑
k=1
hlih
e
ih
l
kh
e
ke
j(θei−θli−θek+θlk)
]
(a)
=
1
nr
nr∑
i=1
E
[
(hli)
2
]
E
[
(hei )
2
]
+
nr(nr − 1)
nr
nr∑
i=1
∑
k 6=i
E
[
hlih
e
ih
l
kh
e
k
]
E
[
ejθ
e
i
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
E
[
ej(−θ
l
i−θek+θlk)
]
=
nr
nr
E
2
[
H2
]
= E2
[
H2
]
.
where (a) is deduced from the uniform distribution assumption for the random phases and the independence of the
fading coefficients and also the phases of the legitimate and non-legitimate channels.
Analysis for variance of Pl:
σ2(Pl)
P 2T
= E

((∑nri=1 (hli)2)2
nr
− (E [H4]+ (nr − 1)E2 [H2])
)2
=
1
n2r
E



 nr∑
i=1
h4i +
nr∑
k=1
∑
q 6=k
h2kh
2
q − nrE
[
H4
]− nr(nr − 1)E2 [H2]

2


=
1
n2r
E




nr∑
i=1
h4i − E
[
H4
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
S1
+
nr∑
k=1
∑
q 6=k
h2kh
2
q − E2
[
H2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
S2


2
=
1
n2r
(
E
[
S21
]
+ 2E [S1S2] + E
[
S22
])
,
where
2E [S1S2] = 4nr(nr − 1)E
[
(H41 − E
[
H4
]
)(H21H
2
2 − E2
[
H2
]
)
]
= 4nr(nr − 1)(E
[
H6
]
E
[
H2
]− E [H4]E2 [H2]),
E
[
S21
]
= nrE
[
(H4 − E [H4])2]
= nr(E
[
H8
]− E2 [H4]),
E
[
S22
]
= nr(nr − 1)(E2
[
H4
]− E4 [H2]) + 4nr(nr − 1)(nr − 2)E [(H21H22 − E2 [H2])(H21H23 − E2 [H2])]
= nr(nr − 1)(E2
[
H4
]− E4 [H2]) + 4nr(nr − 1)(nr − 2) (E [H4]E2 [H2]− E4 [H2]) .
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Hence:
σ2(Pl)
P 2T
=
1
n2r
(
nr(E
[
H8
]− E2 [H4]) + nr(nr − 1)(E2 [H4]− E4 [H2])
+ 4nr(nr − 1)(nr − 2)
(
E
[
H4
]
E
2
[
H2
]− E4 [H2])
+ 4nr(nr − 1)(E
[
H6
]
E
[
H2
]− E [H4]E2 [H2]))
=
4(nr − 1)(nr − 2)
nr
(
E
[
H4
]
E
2
[
H2
]− E4 [H2] )+ · · ·︸︷︷︸ .
Analysis for variance of Pe:
σ2(Pe)
P 2T
= E



∣∣∣∣∣ 1√nr
nr∑
i=1
hlih
e
i e
j(θei−θli)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
− E2 [H2]

2


=
1
n2r
E




nr∑
i=1
(hli)
2(hei )
2 − E2 [H2]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
+
nr∑
k=1
∑
q 6=k
hlkh
e
kh
l
qh
e
qe
j(θlk−θek−θlq+θeq)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2


2
=
1
n2r
(
E
[
A21
]
+ 2E [A1A2] + E
[
A22
])
,
where
E
[
A21
]
= nrE
[(
H21H
2
2 − E2
[
H2
])2]
= nr
(
E
2
[
H4
]− E4 [H2]) ,
E
[
A22
]
= nr(nr − 1)E4
[
H2
]
,
2E [A1A2] = 0.
results in:
σ2(Pe)
P 2T
=
nr − 1
nr
E
4
[
H2
]
+
1
nr
(
E
2
[
H4
]− E4 [H2]) = E4 [H2]+ . . . .
Corollary 3: There are positive coefficients η and ν, such that for the without path loss case, we have:
E [Pl]
PT
> ηnr, (55)
E [Pe]
PT
= η, (56)
σ2(Pl)
P 2T
< ν2nr, (57)
σ2(Pe)
P 2T
< ν2. (58)
Proof: For η we just set
η = E2
[
H2
]
= 4µ2. (59)
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The existence of ν is proved by considering (53) and (54) and the final expression is obtained for these two quantities
and the finiteness of the Rayleigh distribution moments. By substituting the required moments in that final expressions,
this coefficient can be chosen and it can be shown that it is not too large. Note that these coefficients just depend
on the statistical behavior of Rayleigh distribution and its parameter and are chosen independent of other parameters
of our scheme like RS , ǫ and PT .
Now, we prove the main results proposed in the Theorem 4, i.e., the results for the complete model when the path
loss effect is taken in to account. First, we prove (31) and (32). The proofs of (33) and (34) are more elaborate and
needs two lemmas to be proved.
Proof of (31) and (32): Considering the geometry of the network, we have the following common bounds for
all dlis and dei s:
dTR − al <dli < dTR + al, (60)
ae − al <dei . (61)
By using these bounds, we extract the quantities related to the path loss effect from the summations in the
expressions of (29) and (30), so that the remaining terms in the summations change to the same expressions related
to the case without considering the path loss effect. Now, using the results stated in Corollary 3 and by considering
the linearity and monotonicity of the expected value function, (31) and (32) are simply concluded.
Now we prove the two variance results ((33) and (34)). First, we present the following lemmas.
Lemma 5: For any non-negative random variable H , with positive mean, the following inequality is true:
E
[
H3
] ≥ E [H2]E [H] . (62)
Proof: Since H ≥ 0, by using Cauchy-Schwartz inequality for the two random variables H 12 and H 32 , we can
write:
E
[
H3
]
E [H] = E
[(
H3/2
)2
)
]
E
[(
H1/2
)2]
≥ E2 [H2] ≥ E [H2]E2 [H] .
Now, considering its positivity, we divide the above relations by E [H] to obtain the inequality (62).
Lemma 6: For every two i.i.d. random variables X and Y with positive mean and variance and for any two positive
constants a and b such that a < b, the following inequality is true:
Var[(aX + bY )2] < b4Var[(X + Y )2]. (63)
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Proof: By expanding the left side, we show that substituting a by b will increase the variance.
Var[(aX + bY )2] =Var[a2X2 + b2Y 2 + 2abXY ]
=E
[(
a2(X2 − E [X2]) + b2(Y 2 − E [Y 2]) + 2ab(XY − E [XY ]))2]
=E
[
a4(X2 − E [X2])2]+ E [b4(Y 2 − E [Y 2])2]+ E [4a2b2(XY − E [XY ])2]
+ 2a2b2E
[
(X2 − E [X2])(Y 2 − E [Y 2])]+ 4a3bE [(X2 − E [X2])(XY − E [XY ])]
+ 4ab3E
[
(Y 2 − E [Y 2])(XY − E [XY ])] .
In the last equality, the three first terms are clearly non-negative and increasing the coefficients, will increase the
total result. So, substituting a by b increases the Variance. According to the independence assumption, the forth term
can be decomposed to two expected value terms, which both of them are zero. The fifth and the sixth sentence have
a similar form. We show below that the fifth term is always positive. A similar argument is true for the sixth term.
E
[
(X2 − E [X2])(XY − E [XY ])] (a)= E [X3]E [Y ]− E [X2]E [X]E [Y ]
= E [Y ]
(
E
[
X3
]− E [X2]E [X]) (b)> 0.
where (a) is deduced from the independence assumption; (b) is concluded from Lemma 5 and the positivity of the
mean of Y . So, the fifth and also the sixth sentence are positive and therefore all the six sentences have a non-negative
value. Hence, replacing a by b will increase the amount of the variance and the validity of (63) is established.
proof of (33) and (34): Using induction, the recent lemma can be generalized to any number of random variables.
Considering the independence of the fading coefficients and their Rayleigh distribution and using the inequalities
(60) and (61), the generalization of Lemma 6 results in (33) and (34).
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